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Most countries that reform their pension systems initially focus more on the accumulation
phase and pay less attention to the decumulation phase. Policymakers need to ensure that the new
system is administratively efficient, or at least does not collapse under the weight of the
information needs of systems based on many small individual accounts. They need to ensure that
the new system is transparent and well regulated. Early failures of participating institutions
through fraud and misuse of funds is likely to cause a major setback to the whole reform
program. Finally, the number of beneficiaries is initially very small, especially if older workers
are discouraged from joining the new system. While some disability and survivor benefits will be
paid in the early years of the system,  old age pensions will not arise for many years.
But for a successful new pension system the decumulation phase must also be well
organized and efficient. The primary purpose of pension systems is to pay retirement benefits-
old age, survivors and disability pensions. The success of a new pension system depends on its
ability to use whatever capital has been amassed at the end of the active life of covered workers
to provide a reasonably sufficient regular income to them and their dependents. This paper argues
that 1) pay-out arrangements are likely to evolve gradually, through a trial and error process, as
problems are discovered and tackled; 2) adverse selection may not be as great a problem as is
sometimes thought; but 3) many other annuity and insurance market problems remain to be
solved and policies must be formulated to make these markets work well. The insurance sector
will play a central role in the provision of retirement benefits, as well as disability and survivors
benefits, in reforming countries. However, most developing countries have very weak and
underdeveloped insurance sectors. The long-term success of pension reform therefore requires a
vigorous effort to develop the insurance industry.
The next section of this paper reviews the basic characteristics of disability and survivor
pensions and compares arrangements for these types of benefits in different countries. Section 2
focuses on old age and early retirement benefits. It discusses the special issues affecting the
development of annuity markets and draws on the experience of Chile as well as the recent
academic literature on this subject. The third section reviews the measures that are needed tomodernize and strengthen the insurance sector. A Conclusion pulls together the policy issues that
reforming countries must address regarding the payout of benefits.
1. Disability and Survivor Benefits.
The literature on disability and survivor (term life insurance) benefits is not very large,
even though  the provision of these benefits is more immediate than that of annuities. In fact,
disability and survivorship benefits constitute the large majority of benefit payments in the early
years of reformed systems.
Disability and survivor benefits are linked to the active life of workers and are necessary
to protect workers and their dependents from disability and death that occurs prior to retirement
and often prior to the build-up of a large accumulation. Perhaps this accounts for a fundamental
difference between the treatment of disability and survivor benefits on the one hand and old age
benefits on the other. While in most reforming countries, old age benefits are based on defined-
contribution plans and individual accounts, disability and survivor pensions are based on
defined-benefits and group contracts. Usually the benefit is defined as 70% of the average
covered salary over the past five or ten years.
Substantial differences exist in institutional arrangements across countries and the impact
of these differences is an important topic for future study. In Chile and Argentina disability and
survivor benefits are completely privatized-a  response to the extensive abuse and high cost of
the previous public system. In Mexico, they have been kept during the initial phase of the reform
in the public sector in the pre-existing social security institution. This is also the approach
adopted in Eastern Europe. In Peru and Colombia, responsibility is shared between the public
and private pillars, depending on the pillar affiliation of individual workers. In Kazakhstan, no
provision is made for disability and survivor benefits because of the underdevelopment of the
insurance sector and the inability of government to handle these benefits. The intention is,
however, to offer disability and survivor benefits once the insurance sector is better developed.
The assessment of disability appears to be a highly subjective process. The incidence of
disability therefore varies greatly over time and across countries (Lee and Skinner 1999;
Havemann and Wolfe 1990). Given this subjectivity, one might expect that private companies
2would be overly reluctant to certify workers for disability, while public agencies might grant
eligibility too easily, sometimes based on political considerations such as the desire to enable
unemployed older workers to retire on disability when they are not yet eligible for ordinary
pensions. The variety of institutional arrangements  that has developed should enable this kind of
question to be analyzed.
In Chile and Argentina, each pension fund management company is required to arrange
for a group insurance policy covering all its affiliated workers. In principle, the past experience
of the group is presumably taken into account when the group rate is set, once a year. The group
premium is then charged back to individual workers as a percentage of their covered wages,
without distinguishing by age, sex, occupational risk, or any other characteristic. In practice,
however, the rate agreed between the pension fund management company and the insurance
company, which are often affiliated to the same financial group, is also influenced by other
factors, especially tax considerations. When disability or death of an active worker occurs,  .the
outstanding balance on that worker's account and the proceeds of the recognition bond (if any)
are supplemented by a payment from the insurance company concerned, sufficient to provide the
level of benefit set by the pre-determined formula.
As noted, all workers pay the same premium as a percent of covered wage. No allowance
is made for the age of covered workers or for differences in family structure (especially for
differences in the ages of spouses and other beneficiaries). In effect, this means that young
workers with low balances, particularly those in hazardous occupations or many dependents, are
subsidized by older workers who have accumulated large balances in their accounts. The young
workers impose a heavier burden on insurance companies that make up the shortfall in capital
needed to purchase the required benefit. However, a partially compensating mechanism is at
work: Young workers face a lower risk of death or disability and a lower pensionable wage base.
No such compensating mechanism is at play for older female workers, particularly those in safe
occupations, who have lower mortality and disability rates, have built up their individual account
balances, but pay the same insurance premium as higher risk workers. Thus, it can be argued that
3female workers, especially those in safe occupations, subsidize male workers, especially those in
hazardous occupations.
The gradual trial and error process that is likely to take place in reforming countries is
well illustrated by the early experience of Chile. Initially, the law did not impose the use of
uniform premiums for all workers. Variations in insurance premiums reflected the age of family
members, the balance in individual accounts, the years of contributions, and the proportion of
income covered by the insurance policy. This led to a short-lived but considerable confusion, as
different pension fund management companies adopted different pricing approaches, making
comparison of the cost of insurance nearly impossible. Eventually a law was passed
standardizing the premium for all members of a given AFP. While solving one problem, this may
have created another: An individual would now be better off participating in an AFP that has
many members with low probabilities of death or disability, since this, rather than his own
characteristics, will determine his premium. If insurance charges became an important
determninant  of AFP affiliation, this could lead to instability in membership and fees; however, as
of this point in time we have not heard that this poses a problem.
The benefit was initially set equal to 50% of basic income for those with five years of
contributions rising by 5% for every five years of contributions up to 70% of basic income for
those with 25 years of contributions or more. Workers were permitted to increase the level of the
benefit up to 150% of basic income by paying a higher premium, on a voluntary basis. Basic
income was equal to the average of the past 12 months eamings indexed to inflation. However,
the right to increase the level of insured benefit exposed insurance companies to adverse
selection, while the use of the 12-month average real eamings as basic income allowed
manipulation of the pensionable wage base. Higher earnings could be declared in the months
prior to the submission of a claim. In some cases, fake contracts with imaginary employers were
used by self-employed people for this purpose (Titze and Viancos 1998:165). These problems
were fixed with the changes in regulations enacted in 1987 with passage of the so-called "train
4bill".' The right to increase the level of insured benefits was removed and basic income was
redefined as average real earnings over the preceding ten years.
Another early problem concerned certification of disability: some workers claimed they
had not been treated fairly. A central medical commission was established to adjudicate on
complaints and appeals. Closely related was the treatment of partial disability. Because of the
greater strictness in the definition of disability, an increasing number of workers were rejected,
who were partially disabled but did not meet the definition of total disability (a loss of two-thirds
of the ability to work). Partial disability for those who lost between one-half and two-thirds of
the ability to work was authorized in the early 1990s. At the same time, insurance companies
were allowed to pay temporary pensions for the first three years after disability was claimed and
to delay transferring the required capital for the payment of a permanent pension until re-
certification of disability three years later.
In the late 1980s, extensive fraud was discovered with regard to disability claims. Fake
disability reports were sold to healthy people, involving fabricated medical tests and
impersonated medical examinations (Ariztia 1998:79, Titze and Viancos 1998:174). To prevent
such fraud, the regulations were changed to require the use of authorized medical centers with
more rigorous procedures for identifying members.
A basic issue concerned how to encourage greater choice and competition, given that
AFP's controlled these contracts. In Chile and other countries that have followed its approach,
competition has been inhibited by the fact that the pension fund management companies and the
insurance companies with which they deal often belong to the same group of companies. In
Chile, there was extensive use of transfer pricing for most of the 1980s in the division of total
charges between insurance premiums and administrative fees. The same pattern was observed in
Argentina in the mid-i 990s. Tax factors and other considerations (such as the allocation of
revenues and profits between the affiliated companies) rather than actuarial factors were using in
I  The "train  bill" (Law 18646  of 1987)  was the result of an exhaustive  review  of the operation  of
the system  that was started  in 1984  and  was completed  in 1987.  The  bill became  known  as the "train bill"
because  new  "trucks" were continuously  added  containing  new modifications  (Titze  and Viancos
1998:162).
5determining insurance premiums. In such cases a lower insurance premium implied a higher
operating fee for the pension fund management company and vice versa. To tackle this problem
the "train bill" decreed that, on the occurrence of disability or death, the insurance company
contracted by the AFP had to transfer to the individual account the necessary funds that,
combined with the accumulated account balance (and the recognition bond), would be sufficient
to purchase the specified pension. The worker could then use this money to purchase the annuity
from the insurance company of his or her choice. Perhaps in response, Chilean AFP's have
started to sign contracts with non-affiliated insurance companies, from which they get better
terms. These procedures are assisting in the development of a competitive insurance market in
Chile.
Disability and survivors insurance premiums have declined over time, especially in Chile
where a long record of loss experience has been built up. They started at over 2% of wages and
are now only .5% (Schmidt-Hebbel 1999), although transfer pricing may have inflated the
insurance premiums for most of the 1980s. It is closer to 1% in Argentina, and 2.5% in Mexico,
where the system is very new, hence the insurance liability is high since individual accounts are
still minuscule. Another relevant factor in Mexico may be that disability and survivor pensions
are provided by the pre-existing social security institution, which may find it more difficult to
impose rigorous criteria. We are not aware of any study that estimates load factors (percentage of
total premiums that are retained by the insurance companies rather than being paid out to
beneficiaries) in the disability and survivors programs of these countries.
In contrast to Latin America, Switzerland has adopted a different approach, sharing
responsibility for disability pensions between the public and private pillars to ensure that the
granting of disability pensions is neither too generous nor too strict. In Switzerland the public
portion is financed on a PAYG basis; it does not draw on the funds built up in the worker's
individual accounts. Partly for this reason, disability and survivor pensions cost 2.4% of covered
wages--approximately the same as in Latin America in the first years of the new systems, when
account balances were negligible, but much higher than is currently the case in Chile or
Argentina. (The cost of disability insurance in the Swiss private pillar is not known). Another
6reason for the higher current cost in Switzerland may be that disability pensions have tended to
be granted to older workers in declining industries rather than paying such workers
unemployment benefits. This spares workers the stigma of redundancy, but it also conceals the
true level of unemployment and thus reduces social tensions as well as political pressures to
increase employment in other ways.
The last aspect of disability pensions concerns the encouragement of rehabilitation and
re-entry into the labor force. Rehabilitation can be very expensive but if well administered can be
self-financed from the suspension of disability pensions to rehabilitated workers. Rehabilitation,
combined with a more vigorous program of re-certification, has been actively used in the
Netherlands in the 1990s as a means of reducing the large expenditures on public disability
pensions. We have no evidence on the use of these techniques in countries that have privatized
the provision of benefits, although it may be in the interest of insurance companies to do so.
To summarize briefly: whether privatized or handled by public institutions, mandatory
disability and survivor pensions have tended to be organized on the basis of group contracts with
uniform insurance premiums and no allowance for known differences in risk. Thus, low-risk
workers subsidize high-risk ones. An efficient system of disability pensions, whether public or
private, requires a sophisticated certification and re-certification mechanism, use of authorized
medical centers to prevent various types of fraud, and the compilation of comprehensive data on
loss experience. Rehabilitation programs, although expensive to operate, may also contribute to a
reduction in the cost of disability pensions. On the one hand, most developing countries have
weak institutional capacity in the insurance area. On the other hand, most public systems have
abused their disability programs, lacking the incentive to apply rigorous criteria and using them
as a substitute for early retirement and unemployment insurance. High priority should be given to
an analysis of the efficiency, cost and equity of the criteria for granting and denying benefits, in
public, private and mixed system; we now have enough variety to enable a careful study. 2
2  Pension  systems  often  offer other  "pre-retirement"  benefits  such  as allowing  withdrawals  for
housing,  medical  and education  costs.  In countries  where  contribution  rates are very high (as is the case
in Singapore)  provision  of such  facilities  is unavoidable.  In general,  however,  care must be taken to
ensure  that the accumulated  balances  in the pension  accounts  are large enough  to support  a reasonable
annuity  income  in old age.  The issues  raised  by the provision  of "pre-retirement"  benefits are not
7II. Old Age and Early Retirement Benefits
Old age retirement benefits can take three basic forms: lump sum payments; scheduled
withdrawals; or life annuities. We start by discussing the first two forms, but concentrate on
annuities, the only form that provides longevity insurance. On the one hand, some degree of
longevity insurance may be essential for old age security. On the other hand, annuities markets
pose potentially serious problems and difficult policy choices that need to be addressed.
Lump sum payments. These are used extensively in many Anglo-American countries. In
some of these countries, e.g. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the widespread use of
lump sum payments in private pension plans is influenced by the availability of universal public
pensions. In others, e.g. Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the use of lump sums is associated with
the operation of national provident funds.
Lump sum payments are easier to operate as they do not require any of the complex
calculations involved in scheduled withdrawals and annuities. But this does not tell the whole
story. For instance, some workers may use part of their lump sums to purchase annuities, while
others may replicate on an individual basis the system of scheduled withdrawals. Use of the latter
is difficult to detect and analyze, while the former requires an examination of the market for
voluntary individual annuities. Lump sum payments also raise some social policy concerns as
some workers may waste their capital in gambling or excessive consumption and thus deprive
themselves and their families of adequate protection in old age. In cases where the public benefit
is means-tested (as in Australia) moral hazard problems arise when private benefits are lump
sum.
In most OECD countries, company pension schemes and the tax rules that affect their
operations, allow partial commutation of future benefits into a lump sum. This varies between
addressed  in this paper.  One sensible  compromise  approach  could  include  a rule that permitted
withdrawals  that did not exceed  80 to 100  percent  of the accumulated  account  balance  or 20 to 30 percent
of the projected  account  balance  at retirement.  This would  ensure  that an adequate  balance  is left in the
account  for retirement  purposes.  It would  also be consistent  with the nearly  universal  practice  of allowing
lump  sum withdrawals  in defined  benefit  plans of between  20 and 30 percent  of the value  of pension
rights
825% and 33% of the discounted present value of benefits. Available evidence suggests that most
workers opt to make use of this facility.
Scheduled withdrawals.  Often described as programmed withdrawals, these were
introduced in the Chilean pension reform as an alternative to purchasing life annuities-perhaps
because of uncertainty regarding the availability and price of annuities. They are also available in
other Latin American countries like Argentina, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru, though not in
Bolivia where mandatory annuitization is imposed. Similar arrangements are available in the
United Kingdom and Australia, although with some important differences. For instance, in the
United Kingdom scheduled withdrawals are only allowed up to age 75, when annuitization
becomes mandatory (Valdes-Prieto 1998:39).
Scheduled withdrawals have two advantages over life annuities. In the event of early
death, remaining account balances are inherited by dependents, accommodating a bequest
motive. Scheduled withdrawals also allow participation in the likely higher returns achieved by
pension funds compared to the rates offered by insurance companies. They thus operate like
variable annuities but without the benefit of longevity insurance. The absence of longevity
insurance is their main weakness, but they are also exposed to fluctuating payments as a result of
the volatility of pension fund returns.
In Latin American countries, scheduled withdrawals are recalculated each year on the
basis of the remaining life expectancy of the family of covered workers and a stipulated rate of
return. By regulation, the rate of return is equal to the average real return achieved by the pension
fund concerned over the past 10 years. The life table to be used is also set by the regulators.
When rates of return are constant, scheduled withdrawals decline over time because the
life expectancy of their owners falls each year by less than one year. For people who live too
long, the remaining balances and the monthly withdrawal may become too small. This can
become a problem, especially for women, who live longer than men and whose accumulations
are, on average, smaller to begin with.
In Chile, the use of scheduled withdrawals is required in the case of workers whose
pension is below the minimum guaranteed  pension, but workers with benefits that are slightly
9above the minimum may also have an incentive to use scheduled withdrawals rather than life
annuities. They will benefit from the achievement of high returns and their dependents will
inherit any remaining balances in the event of early death, but they will receive the minimum
guaranteed pension if returns are low or if they live too long. One way to contain this moral
hazard is to require the purchase of a deferred life annuity for the minimum amount (Vittas and
Iglesias 1992:7).
As in the case of disability and survivor benefits, the use of scheduled withdrawals in
Chile also went through a series of stages. Initially, no workers were allowed to receive an old
age benefit until they had been in the system for five years, a restriction that was lifted in January
1983. The first calculations of scheduled withdrawals did not allow for future (positive or
negative) investment income; the real rate of return used in calculating scheduled withdrawals
was effectively set at zero. But in the face of the large real returns of the 1980's this resulted in
very low initial pensions and large increases when scheduled withdrawals were recalculated in
1984. The regulations were changed in 1987 and stipulated that the assumed rate of return should
be the lower of the following two rates: the average real return of the past five years for the
pension fund concerned or the weighted average between this rate and the average interest rate
for all life annuities granted over the previous 12 months, with assigned weights of 20% and 80%
respectively (Titze and Viancos 1998:167). Although this was a backward-looking rate, it was
felt that it would be stable enough to avoid large fluctuations in the value of scheduled
withdrawals. However, the second of these definitions exposed insurance companies to a time
lag effect. If they became aggressive in one year, using higher rates and offering better annuities,
they would face stronger competition from scheduled withdrawals in the following year.
In December 1996 the backward-looking period for the rate of return of the pension fund
concerned was increased from five to ten years. This may have been motivated by the decline in
real returns in the mid-  1 990s and the desire to avert sudden substantial falls in the amount of
scheduled withdrawals, but it highlights the difficulty in determining the appropriate rate of
interest for these calculations as well as the risk inherent in tying withdrawals to volatile rates of
return. If real returns continue to be lower than their high levels of the 1980's (as is likely),
10workers who retired in the early 1990's and took scheduled withdrawals may find themselves
with low remaining balances and annual incomes in the twenty-first century. This history also
underscores the almost incessant streamlining of the regulations needed to govern the  pension
funds, including the payout  phase.
Life annuities: market development and adverse selection. The third type of retirement
benefit is the life annuity. Among countries with mandatory second pillars, only Switzerland and
Bolivia  impose the use of annuities. Eastern European countries are also leaning toward
compulsory annuitization. Apart from Bolivia, all other Latin American countries allow the use
of scheduled withdrawals, making annuitization voluntary or rather semi-voluntary because
workers do not have the option of lump sum withdrawals. In Australia annuitization is voluntary
and the existence of the means-tested public pillar creates a moral hazard problem and an
incentive not to annuitize, since the longevity risk is born by the public sector.
Compulsory annuitization is often advocated in order to avoid the problems caused by
adverse selection due to asymmetric information.  Suppose that insurance companies start out
pricing annuities on the basis of the average life expectancy for the population as a whole.
Retiring workers who know that they have a lower life expectancy because of terminal illness or
other health factors that are not observable to insurance companies  will not buy such an annuity,
so the expected lifetime of annuitants will be above average, forcing insurance companies to
raise their prices and leading to another round of adverse selection--with the result that the
annuity market will be smaller and less well developed than if all workers were forced to
purchase an annuity. According to this scenario, workers with average life expectancy will not
have access to longevity insurance at actuarially fair prices in a voluntary insurance market
because of adverse selection.
Markets for voluntary individual annuities are not well developed even in the most
advanced OECD countries, let alone in developing countries. Adverse selection, which causes
average annuity prices to be higher than they would otherwise be, is a factor explaining this
underdevelopment, but it is not clear that it is the most important factor. In recent work at the
World Bank we have started identifying different reasons for the underdevelopment of annuity
11markets. We started from 4 but soon increased their number to 10 and adverse selection is only
one of them. In fact, given the product innovations that insurance companies have introduced
over the years and the growing emphasis on risk classification to avoid cross subsidization
between different groups, one could argue that adverse selection should be far less important in
practice than is often claimed.
In addition to adverse selection, other reasons for the low development of annuity
markets include:
*  The bequest motive and the precautionary motive for saving (to deal with life
contingencies such as large medical bills), which suggest that people will choose to
annuitize, at best, only a part of their retirement savings (Hurd 1989, Bernheim et al
1985);
•  Ignorance and myopia by individuals (who may not understand these complex
contracts and  fail to appreciate the benefit of insuring against the risk of outliving
their assets);
*  Mistrust of insurance companies (who may fail to honor these long-term, irrevocable,
and non-transferable contracts or to produce high investment returns in the case of
variable annuities);
*  Aggressive marketing efforts (which are necessary to overcome the ignorance and
mistrust of the public but which raise the total cost of annuities);
*  Uncertainty about future inflation, real investment returns and overall improvements
in mortality risk (which force insurance companies to adopt conservative policies, use
low discount rates and mortality probabilities, and thus raise reserves and annuity
prices);
*  The likelihood that annuities are a luxury good with a very high income elasticity of
demand, hence an appeal mainly to upper income groups (who have left-over wealth
to annuitize after reserving funds to meet their bequest and precautionary motives);
12*  Tax policies (that may favor the use of lump sum payments on retirement); and last,
but not least,
*  Public policies such as the offer of social security pensions and the encouragement of
occupational pension schemes that tend to crowd out the use of individual annuities
(Vittas and Skully 1991:43-44, Walliser 1998, Auerbach et al 1995, Gokhale et al
1996).
Moreover, while annuities protect against longevity risk, they accentuate many other
types of risk (Walliser 1998, Richter and Ritzberger 1995). For example, annuitizing a
substantial portion of your wealth increases the risk that you will be:
*  Unable to pay large unexpected medical bills or other lumpy emergency needs,
*  Unable to benefit from higher future rates of return (if the annuity is not variable),
- Unable to protect yourself from inflation (if the annuity is not indexed),
*  Without the income that you counted on, due to the failure of the insurance company
to honor its commitment.
Insurance markets try to deal with potential adverse selection through risk classification
and product variety that leads people to self-select themselves into different risk categories.
Product innovation also enables potential consumers to protect themselves against some of the
other risks mentioned above. For example, joint and last survivor annuities, in which payments
continue until the death of the last to die of the named annuitants, address the potential adverse
selection caused by a short life expectancy linked to terminal illness--since it is unlikely that both
spouses would suffer from terminal illness at the same time. Joint and last survivor annuities
with guaranteed payment periods, say 10, 15 or 20 year certain, deal with both adverse selection
and the bequest motive, especially protecting the dependents of annuitants in the event of early
death.
Life annuities with guaranteed payment periods are effectively a combination of a series
of certain dated payments and a deferred annuity starting at the end of the guaranteed period.
13Deferred life annuities cost less than immediate life annuities but they may involve excessive
amounts of reserves since they are exposed to a greater risk of large improvements in cohort
mortality. The combination of deferred annuities and scheduled withdrawals has been offered in
Chile since the late 1  980s but its use has been limited and has involved a short period of
deferment.
Real annuities, which are widely used in Chile and are growing in popularity in the
United Kingdom, provide protection against inflation but require the availability of index-linked
government and other bonds. In Argentina, there are no real annuities because the use of inflation
indexed instruments is not encouraged by the authorities. However, companies are allowed to
issue annuities linked to the US dollar and other foreign currencies that protect against local
hyperinflation. In the United States the recent issue of indexed treasury securities has yet to be
reflected in a supply of real annuities. In the United States and Australia, graded annuities, that
have payouts growing by a specified percentage, are in some use.
Participating annuities allow insurance companies greater flexibility in both investment
policies and reserving for mortality risk. Annuitants participate in the profits earned by insurance
companies as a result of improved efficiency, better investment results, or higher than anticipated
mortality. Variable annuities are an extension of participating annuities as they link payouts to
the performance of some underlying asset. Variable annuities shift the investment risk to
annuitants but they also allow them to benefit from the higher returns that may be achieved by
investing in equities and other higher risk instruments. Variable annuities may also shift the
mortality risk to annuitants. The so-called CREF annuity does this by adjusting the value of units
in the light of both investment performance and mortality risk. New financial instruments may
allow the construction of annuities that have some upward potential but are also partially
protected from downside risk (Bodie 1998). We would expect to see further developments along
these lines as mandatory retirement savings plans grow and partially replace traditional PAYG
social security.
Nevertheless, despite this plethora of products, the fact remains that annuitization
decreases certain risks but increases others and it conflicts with other rational objectives; hence it
14is not at all clear that a risk-averse individual would choose to annuitize a large portion of his or
her retirement wealth. Yet, in most countries with social security, social security wealth is the
largest component of retirement savings and this is compulsorily annuitized. As a result, low-
income workers may find themselves over-annuitized relative to their optimal division of
wealth. And high income workers, who are likely to have a stronger effective demand for
annuities, often have access both to social security and tax-advantaged occupational pensions,
thereby fully satisfying their demand as well. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that additional
annuitization does not take place. 3
If mandatory saving plans replaced social security, as in the reforming countries we are
examining, it is likely that the level of voluntary annuitization would increase. In Chile, for
example, the majority of people who have retired have voluntarily annuitized. The proportion of
those opting for a life annuity has increased from 33% in 1988 to 59% in 1997. This greater
demand for voluntary annuitization, in turn, reduces the potential adverse selection problem. It
should, however, be noted that the decision to annuitize is influenced in Chile by the ability to
convert future income into a lump sum withdrawal. This seems to be achieved through the
payment of a high commission to selling agents and subsequent refund of some of this
commission to the retiree (Valdes-Prieto 1998:35, Titze and Viancos 1998:18  1). Without the
significant commission refund, voluntary annuitization might be considerably less. It is
interesting to note that all annuities in Chile are indexed, contradicting the often cited statement
that the private sector is unable to insure against inflation.
Like the disability market, the annuity market in Chile evolved over time and its growth
was strongly influenced by regulations, especially those concerning the use of discount rates and
the treatment of early retirement. In the early 1980s, insurance companies were forced to use a
3% discount rate in setting their reserves, even though their policies were based on higher rates
3  In one of the seminal  works on annuities,  Friedman  and Warshawsky  (1990:136)  recognize  the
potential crowding out effect of social security and occupational  pensions but they argue that "it is
difficult to believe that the combination  of Social Security  and private pension coverage so precisely
matches each individual's  preferences  for annuity  holding  as to leave only negligible  individual  annuity
demand  remaining".  In their view, adverse  selection  is therefore  a plausible  explanation  for the low level
of voluntary annuitization. Given all the factors mentioned  above, it is equally plausible that social
security  and occupational  pensions  exceed  the demand  for annuities  of many  individuals.
15that were available in the market. This forced insurance companies to hold more capital as the
debt/equity ratio was set at 15:1. However, in 1988 the rules were changed and insurance
companies were allowed to calculate their reserves by using market rates, provided they matched
their assets and liabilities. They then began to actively compete with scheduled withdrawals and
introduced life annuities with guaranteed payments for 10 or 20 years. Regulations can thus
determine how actively insurance companies compete for the annuity business as well as their
prices and the variety of products that are offered.
Insurance companies also benefited from the regulatory changes that made early
retirement more attractive. In the early years of the new system, early retirement was permitted if
a worker could obtain a pension equal to the guaranteed minimum pension or 70% of earnings
over the previous 10 years (whichever was higher). Moreover, the proceeds of the recognition
bond could not be used for financing early retirement since the recognition bond did not mature
until normal retirement age. But in the late 1  980s, discounting of the recognition bond by the
insurance company that issued the life annuity was allowed, and early retirement was permitted
if the worker could obtain 1  10% of the guaranteed minimum pension or 50% of earnings over the
previous 10 years. This increased the demand for early pensions, which could only be in the form
of life annuities. Later on, recognition bonds were permitted to be traded on the stock exchange,
thus lowering the discount rate charged by insurance companies and making early retirement
even more attractive, while early pensions could also take the form of scheduled withdrawals (or
a combination of scheduled withdrawals with deferred annuities).
Early pensions increased from 1% of all pensions in 1988 to 35% in 1997, when 80% of
early pensions were in the form of annuities. In contrast, (normal) old age pensions are
preponderantly in the form of scheduled withdrawals (69% in 1997). To the extent that early
pensions are mainly affordable by high income workers, who have a high income elasticity of
demand for annuities and also have greater longevity, while normal old age pensions are taken by
low income workers who are more likely to choose scheduled withdrawals, this would add to the
appearance of adverse selection although the longevity differential between the two groups
would not in fact be due to adverse selection (asymmetric information).
16Annuities:  loadfactors and money's worth calculations. One of the most controversial
aspects of annuities markets and how they would function in an old age security system with
mandatory retirement saving accounts concerns their load factors-how  much of their premiums
do they retain versus paying back to beneficiaries? Several studies in the United States (Mitchell
et al 1997, Poterba and Warshawsky 1999, Brown et al 1999) have estimated a closely related
concept, the "money's worth" of annuities, defined as the expected present discounted value of
lifetime payouts divided by the initial cost of the annuity. The money's worth can be less than 1
for a worker with average longevity, due to administrative expenses or adverse selection. The
smaller the money's worth, the less desirable annuities would be.
The money's worth calculations made thus far use two alternative interest rates-the
government and corporate bond rates--and two alternative mortality tables-(1)  for the general
population and (2) for the population of annuitants. Since annuitants have a higher expected
lifetime than the population as a whole, the second mortality table yields a much higher money's
worth than the first. The difference between the two is usually attributed to adverse selection; it
could, alternatively, be due to a high-income elasticity of demand for annuities combined with
the positive correlation between income and longevity (on the latter points see Feinstein 1993,
Menchik 1993, Walliser, 1998).4  In either case, the load factor due to differential mortality of
these two groups does not represent a real resource cost; rather, it represents a potential utility
loss of indeterminate size to average-longevity people who would like to annuitize on actuarially
fair terms but are not given this opportunity by markets.5
The calculations and reported results are highly complex and difficult to summarize
because they cover several combinations of discount and mortality rates as well as types of
annuitants and contracts. Combining results from various papers one can show the following
4  Finkelstein  and Poterba  (1999)  draw  an interesting  distinction  between  "active selection",  in
which individuals  use private information  about  their mortality  prospects  in deciding  whether  to purchase
an annuity,  and "passive  selection",  in which  individuals  who choose  to purchase  annuities  may have
other  attributes  that correlate  with greater longevity.  Passive  selection  may be far more important  in
practice  than active  selection,  although  this is an issue  that remains  to be investigated  empirically.
5  This effect on price  would be accentuated  if, as is likely the case,  high-income  annuitants  tended
to purchase  larger  annuities.  The data are usually  not available  to do weighted  money's worth
calculations.
17pattern in money's worth ratios (Table 1). Focusing on the general population and using the term
structure of government bond yields for discounting, the money's worth ratio for US men aged
65 appears to have risen from 75% in 1985 to 85% in 1998. (Using corporate bond rates, the
improvement is from 68% to 77%.) However, using the population of annuitants, the money's
worth ratio appears to have increased from 83% to 97% based on government bond rates (from
74% to 87% with corporate bond rates). Poterba and Warshawsky (1999) have shown that group
or quasi-group contracts arranged through the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees and by
TIAA-CREF for academic personnel in the US, offer superior money's worth ratios to those
available to individuals through the retail market-possibly  because they reduce marketing and
other transactions costs and reap the gains from increased information and bargaining power of
group negotiators.
These results suggest that: (1) the competitiveness of annuity markets has improved over
time; (2) adverse selection or longevity-correlated-income  elasticity of demand accounts for 10-
12 percentage points of the load factor while administrative costs account for 3-13 percentage
points, depending on which discount rate is used, and (3) group contracts lower administrative
costs and adverse selection and should perhaps be utilized.
The part of the load factor that stems from administrative expenses represents a real
resource cost to the economy. However, the part that stems from the higher longevity of the
annuitants' group is more difficult to interpret. Taking the person with average population-wide
longevity as our reference point, the cost of annuities to such persons is 10-12 percentage points
higher than it would be if they could use actuarially fair terms. (For similar calculations that
produce a much lower cost of adverse selection in Canada see Milevsky 1997). If all such
persons did in fact end up annuitizing, this cost would represent a real utility loss to them. But
we know that most of them do not annuitize (given that the annuitants' group has above-average
life expectancy). The utility loss to persons who could have annuitized but chose not to do so is,
by definition, equivalent to less than 10-12 percentage points; it depends on how much they
would have been willing to pay, which we do not observe. In the extreme, for those who would
not have been willing to purchase annuities even at actuarially fair prices (for all the reasons we
18have given above), the utility loss from not being able to do so is zero. Thus, the utility loss
stemming from the non-availability of annuities on terms that are actuarially fair to the average
member of the population may be much less than these numbers imply.
As for administrative costs: If one thinks of the government rate as the appropriate rate
because the income stream from annuities is (virtually) risk-free, these numbers imply that the
average annuitant pays little for administrative costs and gets a high money's worth-
surprisingly high in view of the reputed high marketing costs, mortality reserves and other
expenses of insurance companies. This poses the question--how do these companies cover their
administrative costs and earn their profits? According to these numbers, 10 percentage points of
cost recovery and profits come through risk transformation-charging  according to a risk-free
rate but investing the premiums in riskier assets, and retaining the differential. Insurance
companies may be in a good position to mediate risk because they aggregate resources, can
therefore diversify, reinsure and pass the residual risk on to their stockholders who are willing to
bear it. In this case, the utility frontier is expanded by this combination of longevity insurance
and risk intermediation.
However, for workers who prefer to accept more risk themselves, and who view risky
investments as their alternative, the appropriate discount rate may be the corporate bond rate or
higher, in which case the money's worth ratio would be lower and estimated administrative costs
charged by insurance companies would be higher. Such individuals might prefer to purchase
variable annuities, which would permit them, rather than the insurance company, to earn the
higher return from risky investments. But they may fear making their income dependent on the
investment skills of a particular insurance company, given principal-agent problems and the very
long term irrevocable nature of annuity contracts, which can span 20 years or more. Such
individuals, torn between earning low risk-free rates or potentially higher rates that put them at
the mercy of the investment policy of an insurance company that they do not fully trust, may end
up not purchasing annuities at all. In fact, this may be one of the reasons for the small size of
voluntary annuity markets.
19One way around this dilemma (advocated  by Valdes-Prieto and Edwards 1997 and
Valdes-Prieto 1998) would be the development of insurance pools, into which individuals are
placed based on their expected longevity, which give annuitants some control over their own
investment portfolio. For example, each pool could be associated with a group of mutual funds
among which annuitants could choose. Depending on the amount that was initially annuitized,
each individual would be assured a given number of annuity units, but the unit value would vary
depending on the success of the investments and the mortality experience of each group (see
Valdes-Prieto 1998 for a more detailed explication of this idea).
A simpler method that would minimize principal-agent problems would be to link unit
values to some well-established benchmark such as the S&P 500.6  This would only work in a
fairly stable financial market where today's benchmark is expected to be a reasonable benchmark
20 years into the future; it would not yet work in most Latin American or Asian countries. In a
country like the US, this procedure would allow workers who were less risk averse to capture
some of the equity premium. However, it would also require insurance companies to charge more
explicitly for their administrative costs, since the profit-earning potential of the risk-
intermediation function would be reduced.
Table 1 also summarizes data on the cost of real annuities. In the United Kingdom where
government indexed bonds have long been used, but the market for indexed annuities is small,
the additional administrative cost of real annuities for men aged 65 is slightly over 5%, while for
the United States, where treasury indexed securities were issued only a couple of years ago, in a
program offered by one company the incremental administrative cost of real annuities is as high
as 16%. Loads for real annuities may in theory be higher because they are purchased by workers
with above-average longevity who derive a greater value from inflation protection-but  we do
not know if this turs  out to be true empirically. An alternative explanation for the higher load
factor is that, to avail themselves of the asset-liability matching afforded by index-linked
government bonds, insurance companies must forego their profits from risk intermediation, while
6  Pensioners  who  do not want to be fully exposed  to the volatility  of stock market  retums may  opt
for participating  annuities  or they  may use new synthetic  annuities  that provide  protection  from the
downside  risk of equity  funds.
20if they continue to mediate, they take on greater inflation risk themselves; either way, the
consumer must pay more. We are currently conducting a study for the World Bank which will
carry out similar calculations for a variety of other countries, including Chile, where indexed
annuities dominate, to ascertain what conditions and products lead to a higher money's worth for
annuitants.
Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) report money's worth ratios for nominal, real and 5%
escalating annuities for the UK compulsory and voluntary annuities markets. They generally find
that money's worth ratios are similar to those in the United States for voluntary nominal
annuities, while real annuities cost less than in the United States, presumably because of the
longer availability of indexed bonds in the UK. They also find that money's worth ratios are
higher in the compulsory market, mainly because of a smaller incidence of adverse selection.
However, because the UK compulsory market entails an element of choice in that low-income
workers may opt to stay with the social security system, there is both active and passive selection
in this market, although on a smaller scale than in the voluntary market.
Apart from the numbers derived by these studies, perhaps one of their greatest lessons is
the complexity of the calculations involved. While straightforward estimations of the expected
present discounted value of annuity payouts are ostensibly involved, this requires highly
complicated derivations of the discount and projected mortality rates, with sensitivity analysis
given the uncertainty surrounding these rates. When calculations are so complex and
nontransparent, it is difficult to argue that individuals have a clear notion of the value of
annuities and the extent to which annuity prices may or may not be unfair. Workers may
overestimate future interest rates and underestimate their life expectancies, yet another reason
why they may refrain from purchasing annuities. Additionally, this analysis points to the need for
stronger regulation, higher transparency and better education of workers if they are expected to
engage in such calculations upon retirement.
III. Modernizing the Insurance Sector
The insurance sector is expected to play a major part in the disability, survivors' and
annuity components of the new pension systems and is in fact likely to be one of the main
21beneficiaries of pension reform. However, in most developing countries the insurance sector
suffers from major structural problems. A generally  repressive regulatory framework  has impeded
competition, innovation and efficiency.  Both premiums and new products are subject to vetting and
control by regulatory agencies that are staffed  with bureaucrats  rather than experienced
professionals. A frequent problem is the imposition of investment  rules that force pension funds
and insurance companies to invest their assets in government bonds with highly negative real rates
of return.
The insurance sector in developing countries is often either dominated  by one or two state-
owned companies, with limited presence of privately owned and foreign companies or it is highly
fragmented  with a large number of undercapitalized  and insolvent companies. Insurance companies
are characterized by inadequate capital, low investment  returns, high operating costs, lax control
over brokers, high levels of receivables,  exposure to fraud and unduly high claims by some insured,
and protracted disputes and long delays in settlement  with most customers. These problems
reinforce the mutual mistrust that exists between insurance companies and consumers.
Because of the imposition of tight controls and the absence of reliable data, insurance
companies in most developing countries  have not developed the technical expertise for pricing risks
and setting reserves, while their financial  management is inadequate. Data on loss experience are
not collected in any systematic way and life tables are not properly constructed. In fact, in most
developing countries insurance companies use life tables from advanced countries but pertaining to
the patterns prevailing in those countries 20 or 30 years ago. Price competition in the retail annuity
market is limited by the information  and other search costs involved and by the heavy role that
selling agents play, leading to a wide dispersion in annuity prices even in the US and other
advanced markets.
Thus, to develop and modernize their insurance sectors, most reforming countries need to
undertake radical reforms. These may include restructuring and privatizing dominant state-
owned companies, recapitalizing and consolidating a fragmented sector, opening the local market
to foreign institutions or to joint ventures with multinational insurance groups, modernizing
insurance regulation, enhancing the transparency of insurance policies and annuity contracts, and
22creating an effective insurance regulatory authority. Insurance regulation needs to abandon its
preoccupation with premium and product controls and prescribed investments and to rely on
solvency monitoring and prudent investment policies for ensuring the soundness of individual
companies and the protection of policyholders and annuitants. Of major importance is the
compilation of current and projected life tables and the publication of comparative tables on the
prices charged by insurance companies for different types of products. Training of actuaries and
asset managers is essential and in this foreign companies may play a big part.
Most countries in Latin America as well as several Eastern European countries have
reformed their insurance sectors. Asian countries are currently reforming their insurance sectors
in response to the financial crisis that exposed serious structural weaknesses. In Chile, life
insurance premiums, which include disability, term life and annuity premiums, rose from 0.94%
of GDP in 1984 to 2.11% in 1996, while the total reserves of life insurance companies grew 2%
of GDP to 7% over the same period. In the long run, the reserves of life insurance companies are
expected to surpass the assets of pension funds. But in most other countries, life insurance
premiums remain very low, while the annuities business is almost nonexistent.
IV.  Conclusions and Policy Issues
We have shown that the development of the payout phase of defined contribution pillars
is likely to be a gradual process, as countries learn through experience. One of the key issues for
policy-makers to think about, as this system evolves, is how much group rating and how much
risk classification should they permit or even encourage? It is interesting to note that in Chile and
other Latin American countries group rates are negotiated for disability and survivors' benefits,
while the retirement annuity market is still organized on an individual basis. Perhaps a move
toward greater individualization for disability (as has recently begun) and more group contracts
for annuities (as has recently been considered) would be in order. Group contracts might reduce
search, transactions, marketing and adverse selection costs. Risk classification would prevent
large amounts of cross-subsidization in inequitable directions (e.g. from short-lived poor people
to long-lived rich people) and would avoid the problem that insurance companies might
otherwise try to shun "bad risks." Therefore it is critical to get the right mix. One method might
23place workers into broad risk categories, with a group rate negotiated for each category with a
small number of insurance companies on a competitive bidding basis.
Other policy issues regarding annuities that reforming countries will need to address are:
Should annuitization be mandatory and, if so, at what level? The above discussion leads
us to believe that some level of annuitization should be mandatory, but the appropriate level
should be modest-designed  to keep workers and their families out of old age poverty. Beyond
that, households should be given considerable latitude in determining their time-stream of
consumption in old age. Moreover, the optimal level of mandatory annuitization depends, in part,
on the stream of consumption that workers can expect from durables such as housing that they
may own, and on what arrangements society has made for potential lumpy expenditures such as
health insurance. Allowing partial lump-sum withdrawals could also avoid the problems of high
commissions that is prevalent in Chile. Instead of early pensioning, the rules could allow
contribution holidays for workers who have accumulated the necessary amount of capital for a
minimum pension.
Should indexed annuities be required to avoid large declines in real income during
inflationary periods? This will reduce initial incomes for fixed annuities and may require the
individual to forego the benefits accruing from equity investment in variable annuities.
Should variable annuities to permitted?  This enables risky investment with high returns
to be made, but exposes the individual to volatility at the same time. It may also lead insurance
companies to charge higher explicit administrative fees, since their risk intermediation function
and profits would be reduced.
Should the gradual purchase of annuities be encouraged, to minimize the exposure of the
worker to risk stemming from interest rate fluctuations around his or her retirement date?
(Variable annuities would accomplish the same objective.)'
Should joint annuities be required (as they are in Chile), so that spouses are also
protected; this may be particularly important given the systematically greater longevity of
7  The impact of the gradual purchase of annuities and use of variable annuities is examined in Alier
and Vittas, 1999.
24women who often have not worked for their full adult lives and have little or no retirement
savings accounts of their own.
Which criteria are permissible for risk classification? Race? Occupation? Age of death of
parents? Genetic testing? Obviously we have here a conflict between the value of privacy, on the
one hand, versus the desire to avoid adverse selection and cross-subsidization on the other hand.
Each society must choose its own trade-off here and the trade-off will likely evolve over time.
One of the most controversial such criteria concerns gender-which  is not an allowable
criterion for employment-related pensions in the United States and some European countries,
although it is in most Latin American countries. The argument for unisex tables is that women
who have worked should get the same annual benefits in retirement as men, since many such
women will not outlive many men, even though the average lifetime of females exceeds that of
males; moreover, giving women lower benefits due to their greater longevity may lead to the
socially undesirable outcome that very old women live close to the poverty line. The argument
against unisex tables is that they imply a redistribution from men to women (including from poor
men to rich women), an incentive for insurance companies to "cream" by trying to sell to men
rather than women, and financial problems for companies that unexpectedly end up with a
disproportionate share of women. This topic, too, is currently under examination at the World
Bank. For a discussion of these and other policy issues see Walliser 1998.
In fact, all these policy choices require careful thought and extensive empirical analysis
(See James and Vittas 1999 for a first attempt at an international comparative study). Unlike
many predictions that are needed to place a value on disability, survivors and annuity insurance,
that have a wide margin of error, it is safe to predict that reformed social security systems will
make the study of these insurance products a growth industry for many years to come.
25Table 1
Money's Worth Ratios
General  Population  Annuitants
Treasury  Corporate  Treasury  Corporate
US Men  65
1985  0.749  0.677  0.827  0.740
1990  0.814  0.745  0.912  0.828
1995  0.816  0.742  0.916  0.825
1998  0.849  0.772  0.970  0.871
US  JLS 65
1995  0.841  0.750  0.890  0.788
ILONA  US 1998
Nominal  0.864  na  0.987  na
Real  0.702  na  0.822  na
UK  Men  65, 1998a
Nominal  0.908  na  0.908  na
Real  0.854  na  0.854  na
UK  Men  65, 1998b
Compulsory,  Nominal  0.897  na  0.944  na
Voluntary,  Nominal  0.865  na  0.953  na
Compulsory,  Real  0.822  na  na  na
Voluntary,  Real  0.791  na  na  na
Compulsory,  5% Escalating  0.858  na  0.922  na
Voluntary,  5% Escalating  0.804  na  0.930  na
Sources:  US  Men  65  for 1985,  1990  and 1995  (pre-tax):  Mitchell  et al (1997)
US  Men  65  for 1998:  Poterba  and  Warshawsky  (1999)
US  JLS  65 (pre-tax):  Mitchell  et al (1997)
ILONA  US 1998:  Brown  et al (1999)
UK  Men  65, 1998a:  Brown  et al (1999)
UK  Men  65, 1998b:  Finkelstein  and  Poterba  (1999)
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